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In response to the respondent's brief, the appellant makes the following legal arguments. 
1. The District Court Erred In Its Order Affirming The Magistrate's Rejection Of An 
Instruction On Accident Or Misfortune. 
A review of the record and applicable law does not support the determination of the 
Magistrate or the affim1ation of that decision by the District Court that Ms. Hopkins was not 
entitled to an instruction on accident or misfortune. A further review of the evidence also 
established that there was not substantial and competent evidence to convict Ms. Hopkins at trial. 
The District Court relied on State v. Nunes 131 Idaho 408,958 P.2d 34 (Ct.App.1998) in 
asserting that Ms. Hopkins' act of opening the door was intentional, and therefore the damage 
which occurred was a direct result and natural consequence of her conduct. (R. p.116). In 
Nunes, the Court began with the operative statutory language, and held that the definition of 
malice takes two alternative forms: it may be a "wish to vex, annoy or injure another" of "an 
intent to do a wrongful act" Id at 409. The Court in Nunes further held that the only form of 
malice at issue was the intent to do a wrongful act. Id. The State's theory was established 
through evidence that Nunes intentionally smashed the lock on the gasoline tank valve, the 
defense argued that because his intention was only to break the lock and not break the valve he 
did not have the required intent. Id. The Court held that Nunes' conduct was a deliberate effort 
to damage another person's property and the State is not required to prove the intent to a 
particular degree or scope of injury. 
In contrast, in State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, P.2d 1089 (Ct.App.1993) the Court held 
that LC. § 18-7001 creates culpability for malicious injury to property only where the 
defendant's conduct causing the injury is accompanied by an intent to injure property of another. 
Id at 670. In Nastoff the state's theory was that the defendant acted "maliciously" when he 
operated a chainsaw while knowing it had been illegally modified. Id at 669. The Court held that 
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Nastoff could not properly be found guilty of violating LC. § 18-7001 absent evidence he 
intended to burn the timber. The State was required to prove that Nastoff harbored the intent to 
knowingly injure the real or personal property of another that he did not own. 
The District Court held that "Ms. Hopkins was angry about her brother's sentence and 
that she, in a fit of anger, pushed the door into the wall, causing the hole." (R. p.115) There was 
no testimony to that regard, the district court seems to infer that because she pushed the door 
open angrily, she harbored the intent to purposefully push the door into the wall causing damage. 
However there was no testimony that she purposefully pushed the door into the wall or even that 
she had the intent to push the door into the wall to cause damage. The District Court failed to 
further address the trial court's own assertion that it believed Ms. Hopkins did not purposely put 
a hole in the wall of the courthouse and that the hole was not what Ms. Hopkins intended to 
come out of her actions. (Tr. p. 195, Ls.6-13). 
In this case the district court fails to see the difference between Nunes and Nasta.ff in its 
assertions. In Nunes the defendant was committing a wrongful act by attempting to break the 
lock on the gas valve, which then caused damage where as in Nasta.ff the defendant was using an 
illegally modified chainsaw, and may have acted negligently but did not act with malice because 
he did not harbor the intent to cause the fire. Ms. Hopkins case is more similar to that of Nasta.ff 
where her intent was to open a door, and even if the intent was to open the door angrily she did 
not act with malice because she did not harbor the intent to cause a hole in the wall and damage 
the property of another. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Hopkins respectfully requests that this case be 
remanded to the magistrate with instructions to vacate the judgment of convictions and enter a 
judgment of acquittal. 
DATED this 23rd day of October 2014. 
HEIDI JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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